



W WO OR RK KI IN NG G   P PA AP PE ER R   N NO O. .   7 78 8 
 
Inflation Dynamics and Subjective 
Expectations in the United States 
 
  





This version June 2009  





University of Naples Federico II 
 
University of Salerno 
 
Bocconi University, Milan 
CSEF - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance  
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS – UNIVERSITY OF NAPLES 
80126  NAPLES - ITALY 
Tel. and fax +39 081 675372 – e-mail: csef@unisa.it  
 
 





Inflation Dynamics and Subjective Expectations in the United States 
  
Klaus Adam





We estimate a forward looking New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) for the U.S. using data from the Survey of Professional 
Forecasters as proxy for expected inflation. We find that the NKPC captures inflation dynamics well, independent from 
whether output or unit labor costs are used as a measure of marginal costs. We show that identification of expectations 
exploiting orthogonality to output is severely distorted and explains why the NKPC estimated with survey data performs much 
better than under rational expectations. We also find that lagged inflation enters the price equation significantly suggesting 
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captures the role of lagged inflation reasonably well. 
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the ability of sticky price models to explain the dynamics of U.S.
inﬂation when using survey data as proxies for inﬂation expectations.
Testing sticky price models with survey expectations is attractive since, to the extent
that survey data correctly capture agents’ expectations, they allow to disregard issues re-
lated to the speciﬁcation of agents’ expectations functions. One neither has to impose
untested orthogonality restrictions, as required when estimating under the assumption of
rational expectations, nor has to make restrictive assumptions about the precise form of
non-rationality present in agents’ forecast functions. This allows to focus on the question
whether the economic models under consideration are correctly speciﬁed.
Previous tests of sticky price models, performed under the assumption that agents hold
rational expectations, have generated mixed results. Prominently, Fuhrer and Moore (1995)
have reported that sticky price models do not generate suﬃcient stickiness for inﬂation when
the output gap is used as a measure of real marginal costs. Recent evidence, however, has
shown that the empirical performance depends crucially on how one measures real marginal
costs, the main determinant of inﬂation according to sticky price models. For instance, Gal´ ı
and Gertler (1999) and Sbordone (2002) show that sticky price models perform well once
marginal costs are approximated by average unit labor costs.1
It makes an important diﬀerence whether sticky price models successfully explain inﬂa-
tion dynamics as a function of output behavior or whether they relate inﬂation dynamics
to the behavior of unit labor costs. Given that the ultimate objective is a model explain-
ing the joint behavior of output and inﬂation, the latter case would require an additional
empirically plausible theory linking the dynamics of unit labor costs to the behavior of
output.
1A diﬀerent view about the ability of unit labor costs to explain U.S. inﬂation dynamics has recently
been expressed by Rudd and Whelan (2001, 2002).The present paper studies whether the currently popular New Keynesian Phillips Curve
(NKPC), which can be derived from Calvo (1983) style sticky price models, is able to ex-
plain a relationship between inﬂation on the one hand and output or unit labor costs on the
other hand. Thus, we let the data speak whether a theory linking output to costs is war-
ranted, once expectations are approximated by data reported in the Survey of Professional
Forecasters.
Our main ﬁnding is that the NKPC performs equally well with both measures of
marginal costs, output and unit labor costs. Whatever measure is used, the estimate of
the quarterly discount factor is close to one and the point estimate of the degree of price
stickiness implies that ﬁrms reset their prices roughly every ﬁve quarters on average.
These results suggests that potential non-rationalities in expectations, as they show up
in surveys, have biased previous estimates using output as a measure for marginal costs.
Quite surprisingly, the same non-rationalities do not seem to play a role when using unit
labor costs. Here our estimates conﬁrm the results obtained by Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999) and
Sbordone (2002) who assumed rational expectations.
We show that the reason for this ﬁnding is that approximating the agents’ information
set using the unit labor cost variable rests on more solid grounds than approximating it
using the output variable. In particular, the survey data suggests that the hypothesis
of rational expectations implies a too high correlation between lagged output and future
inﬂation expectations. We show that this causes the coeﬃcient estimate for output to
become negative, contrary to what is implied by theory.
These results suggest that once one takes account of potentially non-rational expecta-
tions via survey expectations, sticky price models are able to establish a close link between
output dynamics and the behavior of inﬂation.
To check for the robustness of this ﬁnding, we include into the price equation lags of
various variables and test for their signiﬁcance. While lagged measures of marginal costs
(unit labor costs and output) and lagged expectations remain insigniﬁcant, lagged inﬂation
enters signiﬁcantly. Moreover, lagged inﬂation remains signiﬁcant even when we account
for the fact that agents might use this variable to inform their inﬂation forecasts.
The signiﬁcance of lagged inﬂation suggests that this variable plays a role in explaining
inﬂation dynamics that goes beyond explaining how actual inﬂation expectations mightdeviate from rationality, contrary to what seems to be the predominant interpretation in
the recent literature.
To account for the role of lagged inﬂation we estimate the inﬂation-indexation model
of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001) where lagged inﬂation enters because ﬁrms
are assumed to index their prices using lagged inﬂation rates in periods where they do not
adjust prices optimally. We obtain signiﬁcant estimates of the correct sign for all parameters
independently of the measure of marginal cost used. This suggests that the indexation
model may account for the role of lagged inﬂation if it is combined with subjective inﬂation
expectations.
Obviously, we are not the ﬁrst to estimate sticky price models using survey expectations.
Roberts (1995, 1997) estimated sticky price models using the Livingston and Michigan
surveys and showed that sticky price models can account for inﬂation dynamics at a semi-
annual or annual frequency. Since data in the Survey of Professional Forecasters is collected
on a quarterly basis we can construct a quarterly model. Our estimates thereby remain more
easily comparable to recent estimates based on quarterly data.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present conditions under which
the ﬁrst order conditions characterizing ﬁrms’ optimal pricing decision give rise to a New
Keynesian Phillips Curve when expectations are potentially non-rational. Section 3 presents
the data and assesses the rationality of survey expectations. The estimation results for the
benchmark NKPC are presented in section 4 and their robustness is analyzed in section
5. Section 6 then presents the results for the inﬂation indexation model and a conclusion
brieﬂy summarizes.
2 Monopolistic Price-Setting with Subjective Expectations
This section derives the New Keynesian Phillips Curve for the case where expectations
are subjective and potentially non-rational. The resulting Phillips curve will be similar to
widely used speciﬁcations of Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999) and Roberts (1995). For illustrative
purposes we use Calvo’s (1983) time-dependent pricing model to derive our results but sim-
ilar reduced-form Phillips curve equations can be obtained using the quadratic adjustment
cost model of Rotemberg (1982).Firms in monopolistic competition must precommit to prices that can be reset with prob-
ability 1−θ ∈ (0,1) each period. Firms’ forecasts are produced by professional forecasters.
Each forecaster i ∈{ 1,...I} thereby advises a ﬁxed share 1
I of ﬁrms. The (subjective)
forecast delivered by forecaster i will be denoted by Fi
t [·].
Let Pt denote the aggregate price level at period t and P∗i
t the price chosen by a ﬁrm
that can reset prices in period t and is advised by forecaster i. Then the new price level
can be expressed as







t + θPt−1 (1)
The new price level is a convex combination between the old price level and the average
price selected by ﬁrms that adjust their price. Firms that reset prices maximize expected
























where β ≤ 1 is the discount factor, ε>1 is the elasticity of the demand function, and MC
are the nominal marginal costs of production. Linearizing the ﬁrst order conditions of this
problem around a zero inﬂation steady state delivers
p
∗,i









where lower case variables denote percentage deviations from steady state. Under the
assumption of rational expectations equations (1) and (3) can be used to derive the familiar
New Keynesian Phillips Curve
Πt = βEt [Πt+1]+
(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
θ
rmct (4)
where current inﬂation is a function of (rational) inﬂation expectations and real marginal
costs rmct.
Deriving an equation similar to equation (4) when expectations are subjective is not
entirely obvious. Proﬁt-maximizing prices depend on nominal costs and therefore on fore-
casted inﬂation. Inﬂation is determined by other agents’ pricing decisions and their marginalcost forecasts. As a result, optimal price setting behavior would require forecasting the
marginal cost forecasts of others, see Woodford (2001) for a recent treatment. Obviously,
expectations survey data do not report agents’ subjective forecasts of other agents’ fore-
casts. Therefore, we want to delineate conditions under which subjective inﬂation forecasts
summarize all beliefs about other agents’ marginal cost expectations.






t+1 [mct+s] − Fh
t [mct+s]
 
=0 ∀i,h,s > 0( 5 )
Condition 1 requires that agents do not expect that current forecasts of future variables
will be revised in a particular direction in the next period, i.e. they do not expect pre-
dictable movements of their own or other agents’ expectations. This is the case whenever
expectations fulﬁll the ’law of iterated expectations’.
Importantly, condition 1 does not rule out non-rationalities in expectations. Suppose,
for example, that marginal costs are expected to follow an AR(1) process where multi-step
forecasts are obtained by simply iterating the AR(1) equation. Condition 1 is then satisﬁed
but expectations will be non-rational if actual inﬂation follows some other stochastic process.
Appendix 8.1 shows that whenever condition 1 holds, the subjective inﬂation forecast of
the aggregate inﬂation rate is a suﬃcient statistic summarizing all forecasts of other agents’
forecasts. One then obtains a Phillips curve of the form:
Πt = βFt [Πt+1]+
(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
θ
rmct (6)
The only diﬀerence to the Phillips curve in equation (4) is that rational expectations are








t [·]( 7 )
3 Data Issues
This section describes the data used to estimate equation (6). A more detailed description
of data sources and variable deﬁnitions is given in appendix 8.2.We use quarterly U.S. data from 1968:4-2003:1 where the starting date is determined
by the availability of inﬂation survey data. Inﬂation is calculated using the implicit GDP
deﬂator.2 We use aggregate GDP and GDP inﬂation instead of data for the non-farm private
business sector, which is the usual sector considered in the literature, because inﬂation
forecasts are available only for aggregate deﬂators. Since non-farm private business accounts
for approximately 75% of aggregate GDP our results can be expected to be comparable to
the remaining literature.3 In any case, the broader activity measure should only strengthen
the importance of our ﬁndings.
We use two measures for the real marginal costs in equation (6). Firstly, we use the
unit labor costs. This is the measure used by Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999) or Sbordone (2002).4
Secondly, we consider the output gap, obtained by linearly detrending the log of real GDP.
5 The output gap has been used by Fuhrer and Moore (1995), for example.
Figure 1 graphs the unit labor costs and the output gap. The ﬁgure shows that there
is a negative contemporaneous correlation between the two series, as was the case for the
data used by Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999).
Inﬂation expectations are approximated with data from the Survey of Professional Fore-
casters. The survey collects data from around 80 professional forecasters on a quarterly basis
from 1968 onwards. A description of the survey can be found in Croushore (1993). Given
that we estimate a quarterly model, we use the mean of the one-quarter ahead inﬂation
forecast for the implicit GDP deﬂator as the measure for expected inﬂation in equation (6).
Figure 2 plots actual and expected quarterly inﬂation rates and shows that actual and
expected inﬂation rates move closely together over the sample period.6
To assess whether inﬂation forecasts are biased or ineﬃcient we perform a standard test.
This test requires to regress actual inﬂation rates on a constant and on expected inﬂation
2GNP Deﬂator prior to 1992 since subjective forecasts related to GNP data before this date.
3Proxing real activity with the output in the non-farm business sector or in the non-farm business sector
less housing leads to similar results as reported in this paper.
4We follow these authors and use data for the non-farm private business sector only. We also tried the
ratio of the compensation to employees to the national income minus the proprietor’s income, which leads
to similar results.
5At the 5% level we reject that the series of real GDP exhibit a quadratic trend.
6At each date the ﬁgure shows actual quarterly inﬂation and the forecast made for this rate in the previous
quarter.rates and to check if the constant is equal to zero and the coeﬃcient pertaining to the






and shows that based on this test one cannot reject rationality of survey expectations.
A closer look at ﬁgure 2, however, suggests that expected inﬂation is lagging actual
inﬂation slightly. Indeed, it is not diﬃcult to ﬁnd evidence that the survey expectations
are ineﬃcient. In particular, the constant appearing in equation (8) is not equal to zero
in various sub-periods. This is shown in table 1, which presents results from regressing
forecast errors on a constant and dummy variables for the 1970’s and 1980’s, where the
latter intend to capture diﬀerent policy regimes.
The estimates in table 1 show that inﬂation expectations have been signiﬁcantly below
actual inﬂation rates during the 1970’s and considerably above the actual rates during the
1980’s and 1990’s. This seems hardly surprising given that inﬂation rates were generally
rising during the 1970’s but falling thereafter and indicates that forecasts are far from being
eﬃcient (see also Croushore (1996)).
Table 2 presents further evidence on the time series structure of forecast errors. Col-
umn two of the table shows that forecast errors display signiﬁcant positive autocorrelation.
Correlation moderately decreases when accounting for diﬀerent policy regimes via time
dummies in the third column.
To the extent that survey expectations correctly capture inﬂation expectations the pre-
vious evidence shows that these expectations are ineﬃcient and, thus, can be biased during
sub-periods. This suggests that forecast errors will generally not be orthogonal to informa-
tion available to agents at the time of the forecast. This is important because instrumental
variable techniques, which are commonly employed to estimate the NKPC under rational
expectations, assume orthogonality of forecast errors with respect to lagged information.
To check whether commonly used instruments are correlated with the forecast errors
implied by the survey data, we regressed these errors on a constant and lags of output,
7The values in parentheses are asymptotic Newey-West 12 lags standard errors. The lag structure follows
Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999).inﬂation, unit labor costs, commodity price inﬂation, and all variables together. The upper
panel of table 3 reports F-statistics testing the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients on lags
1 to 4 of these regressors are jointly equal to zero. The hypothesis is strongly rejected in all
cases. The results are similar in the lower panel of table 3 where we regress forecast errors
on lags 2 to 4 only: the assumption that agents do not know the ﬁrst lag of the considered
variables does not seem to be responsible for the rejection of the orthogonality conditions.
To the extent that survey data correctly capture agents’ inﬂation expectations, these
preliminary ﬁndings cast doubts on the validity of Phillips curve estimates that have been
derived under the assumption of rational expectations.
4 Estimation Results
This section presents the results from estimating equation (6) with the data set described
in the previous section.
If theory was correct and all variables were measured without error, then equation
(6) would perfectly ﬁt the data. Obviously, this is highly implausible for a number of
reasons. The time dependent pricing setting rules underlying equation (6) are at best
an approximation to ﬁrms actual price setting behavior. Moreover, the variables entering
equation (6) are not precisely measured by our data; this might hold for the GDP deﬂator
as well as for the two measures of real marginal cost.
We proceed by assuming that deviations from equation (6) are due to measurement
error. Consequently, we estimate
Πt = βF t [Πt+1]+λrmct + εt (9)
where εt captures measurement errors and where
λ =
(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
θ
Measurement errors might aﬀect the left-hand and right-hand side of equation (9). Er-
rors aﬀecting the left-hand side are of little concern since OLS estimators can deal with it.
Measurement errors on the right-hand side, however, would require the use of instrumental
variable (IV) estimators. Right-hand side errors could arise because we replaced the meanexpected inﬂation by the sample average across forecasters or because of our approximate
real marginal cost measures. Since the consistency of OLS estimates cannot be rejected for
our sample, as shown in section 5, we will report OLS estimates of equation (9) below.
Table 4 shows the estimates of equation (9) when using the unit labor costs (column 2)
and the output gap (column 4), respectively, as a measure for marginal costs.8 Indepen-
dently from the speciﬁcation of marginal costs, all coeﬃcients have the correct sign and are
signiﬁcant at least at the ﬁve percent level. In particular, the discount rate is close to one,
as theory would predict, and the estimate of λ is positive.
The value for the degree of price stickiness θ implied by the point estimates for β and
λ is also reported in the table. The estimates suggests that ﬁrms adjust prices roughly
once every 5 quarters on average. This seems largely consistent with survey data on price
stickiness, see Blinder et al. (1998).
The results for the unit labor costs are largely in line with estimates obtained by Gal´ ı
and Gertler (1999) who assumed inﬂation expectations to be rational. The only diﬀerence is
that the point estimate of the discount factor is much closer to one in our case. The relative
robustness of the ﬁndings of Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999) is rather surprising since, as shown
in table 3, the forecast errors implied by survey expectations are not orthogonal to lagged
unit labor costs, which is an identiﬁcation assumption made by these authors. This seems
to suggest that the distortion caused by such an identiﬁcation assumption is not strong
enough to seriously aﬀect the parameter estimates. We will come back to this point below.
Even more surprising are the results reported for the output gap in table 4. It has
been rather diﬃcult to obtain parameter estimates with the correct sign and of a plausible
magnitude when using output as a measure for marginal costs. Fuhrer and Moore (1995)
and Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999), for example, ﬁnd a negative and insigniﬁcant estimate of
λ when real marginal costs are approximated by detrended output. Table 4, however,
shows that with the help of survey expectations one can establish a plausible link between
output and inﬂation dynamics via the NKPC. This suggests that the assumption of rational
expectations is not innocuous in this case.
8Since Bartlett tests reject the null hypothesis that the residuals follow a white noise we use the Newey-
West correction with twelve lags to compute the standard errors for the regression.Obviously, one might ask whether these results emerge simply because survey expecta-
tions proxy for lagged inﬂation. To assess whether this is the case, we estimate equation
(9) replacing expected with lagged inﬂation. Results are reported in columns three and
ﬁve of table 4. While the result for the output gap remains almost unchanged, the coeﬃ-
cient estimate for the unit labor costs changes considerably and even becomes insigniﬁcant,
suggesting that survey expectations do not simply proxy lagged inﬂation.
The previous ﬁndings show that taking account of non-rationalities in expectations seems
to be important when using the output gap as a measure of marginal costs but less so when
using unit labor costs. A detailed explanation for this ﬁnding is given in the remainder of
this section.
For the case of unit labor costs, the correlation between next period’s actual inﬂation and
marginal costs is of about the same size as the correlation between the subjective expectation
of next period’s inﬂation and marginal costs. This suggests that inﬂation expectations
incorporate large part of the information contained in current unit labor costs.9
The situation is quite diﬀerent for the case of the output gap. There, the correlation
between next period’s actual inﬂation and current output is much higher than the corre-
lation between expected inﬂation and output. Thus, identifying restrictions that impose
orthogonality of forecast errors with respect to current output impute too much information
to expectations.
To see how a change in these correlations might induce a change in the sign of the





corr(Πt,rmc t) − corr(Ft [Πt+1],rmc t) · B
 
(10)
where A is the determinant of a positive deﬁnite matrix and therefore always positive
and B = corr(Ft [Πt+1],Πt) is approximately equal to 0.8 and independent from whether
subjective expectations or actual future inﬂation rates are used as a proxy for expected in-
ﬂation.10 Given this, the sign of λ depends mainly on the diﬀerence between corr(Πt,rmc t)
9The fact that corr(Πt+1,rmc t) ≈ corr(F t[Πt+1],rmc t) implies that in a regression of the forecast error
(Πt+1 −F t[Πt+1]) on a constant and marginal costs rmct the coeﬃcient in front of rmct is (approximately)
equal to zero. Thus, rmct cannot explain the forecast errors. Obviously, this does not imply that forecasts
contain the information in lagged values of rmct. Table 3 shows that this is not the case.
10corr(·,·) denotes the correlation coeﬃcient between two variables.and corr(Ft [Πt+1],rmc t).
Actual inﬂation is more strongly correlated with lagged output than with contemporane-
ous output. This is shown in ﬁgure 3, which depicts the correlations together with the 95%
conﬁdence intervals.11 Thus, the estimated coeﬃcient is negative (or insigniﬁcant) when
output is used as a measure for real marginal costs and when actual inﬂation is the measure
for expected inﬂation.12 When substituting actual inﬂation by subjective expectations the
coeﬃcient turns positive again because the correlation between subjective inﬂation expec-
tations and the output gap is much lower than the same correlation for actual inﬂation.
This explains the changed sign for the λ coeﬃcient.
When unit labor costs are used then the diﬀerence in the correlation coeﬃcients is
positive and almost independent from the measure of expected inﬂation (actual inﬂation
or subjective forecasts). While corr(Ft [Πt+1],rmc t) is smaller than corr(Πt,rmc t)w h e n
expectations are subjective, as one would expect, the same holds when expectations are
rational. Figure 4 depicts the dynamic correlation between actual inﬂation and unit labor
costs together with the 95% conﬁdence intervals.13 The ﬁgure shows that both variables
are contemporaneously correlated. Consequently, the coeﬃcient estimate remains positive
when assuming rational expectations.
The previous results show that the NKPC can link inﬂation dynamics to both output gap
and unit labor cost dynamics once survey data are used to proxy for inﬂation expectations.
At the same time, survey data suggest that the identiﬁcation of expectations assuming
orthogonality with respect to output is responsible for the unsatisfactory performance of
the NKPC when using output as a measure for marginal costs.
5 Robustness of the Results
5.1 Consistency of OLS Estimates
Since measurement error may be present on the right-hand side of equation (9) we tested
for the consistency of our OLS estimates. This can be done using the Hausman test which
11Conﬁdence intervals have been computed using bootstrapped standard errors.
12Taking actual inﬂation is similar to assuming that expectations are rational. It is identical when shocks
are absent, i.e. in a perfect foresight equilibrium.
13Conﬁdence intervals have been computed using bootstrapped standard errors.compares instrumental variable estimates with OLS estimates. The null hypothesis under
scrutiny is that OLS generate consistent estimates of the parameters in equation (9).
We computed the Hausman test for both measures of real marginal costs. Since the
qualitative results are identical we report only those obtained for unit labor costs.
The set of instruments used includes the lag of expected inﬂation and marginal costs.14
The instruments pass the Hansen-Sargan test with a statistic equal to 0.007, which corre-
sponds to a p-value of 0.9965. F-tests strongly reject the hypothesis that the coeﬃcients
in the regressions of expected inﬂation and marginal costs on the instruments are jointly
equal to zero. The F-statistics for the expected inﬂation and marginal costs are 815.07 and
384.27, respectively. This shows that the chosen instruments do not violate overidentifying
restrictions and are correlated with the variables in the regression.
Estimating equation (9) with the chosen instruments and computing the Hausman statis-
tic15 implies a p-value of 0.9873 for the null hypothesis that OLS estimates are consistent.
This justiﬁes the use of OLS estimates in the previous section.
5.2 Sub-Sample Stability
In this section we analyze the stability of the Phillips curve relationship by considering the
estimates obtained from diﬀerent sub-samples.
We split the sample into 3 approximately decade-long sub-periods: 1968:4-1979:4, 1980:1-
1989:4, and 1990:1-2003:1. Splitting the data set in this way generates sub-samples with
rather diﬀerent inﬂation experiences. While inﬂation has been volatile and rising in the
1970’s, inﬂation dropped during the 1980’s and has been low and relatively stable during
the 1990’s, as shown in ﬁgure 2.
To the extent that these diﬀerences have been caused by diﬀerences in the conduct of
monetary policy, a test for parameter stability in the three sub-samples may be considered
14The use of lagged variables as instruments is legitimate if the measurement error has no structure
(classical measurement error). We also tried more lags of expected inﬂation and marginal costs and results
do not change.
15The statistic is equal to 0.03 and tests the null that the diﬀerence in coeﬃcient is not systematic.to be a test for the policy invariance of the price-setting assumption underlying the Calvo
(1983) formulation of the NKPC.
Table 5 reports the coeﬃcient estimates for the three sub-samples. Reassuringly, all
coeﬃcients have the correct sign independent of the sample period and the measure of
marginal costs used. Moreover, except for the output gap coeﬃcient in the period 1968-
1979 all marginal cost measures are statistically signiﬁcant.
The Chow test rejects the hypothesis of sub-sample stability across the three periods
independently from the measure of marginal cost used.16 The estimates in table 5 also
suggest that the discount factor has been higher during the 1970’s than during the 1980’s
and 1990’s.17 Giving an economic interpretation to this ﬁnding seems diﬃcult in the light
of the underlying theory.
Comparing the estimates for the degree of price stickiness θ reported in table 5 across
sub-periods suggests that price rigidity has been higher during the 1990’s than during the
1970’s. Thus, the underlying pricing rules seem not to be invariant to the inﬂation process,
as one might expect. The higher and more variable inﬂation experience during the 1970’s
might have caused ﬁrms to reset their prices more often than this was the case during the
1990’s where inﬂation was low and stable.
Overall, the picture emerging from the sub-samples is not too disappointing. Despite
some important diﬀerence across the diﬀerent time periods, all estimates still have the
correct sign. Moreover, there is no evidence that the performance of the Phillips curve
depends on the measure of marginal costs used, which is the main ﬁnding obtained for the
whole sample period.
5.3 The Role of Lagged Variables
We now assess to what extent the data attribute a role to lagged variables in explaining
inﬂation dynamics. This is done by adding lagged values of inﬂation, expected inﬂation,
and marginal costs to equation (9). We consider this ad-hoc variation as a robustness check
16The F-Statistics of the test are 20.75 and 19.64 for unit labor costs and output gaps, respectively.
17A similar result appears in table 4 of Gali and Gertler (1999) for the case where the GDP-deﬂator is
used to measure inﬂation.to see whether the data favor the Phillips curve of equation (9) or rather some alternative
speciﬁcation.
Table 6 reports the estimation results. Except for lagged inﬂation, which enters signiﬁ-
cantly in both speciﬁcations, all other lagged variables remain insigniﬁcant at the 5% level.
When adding either lagged expectations or lagged marginal costs, the parameter estimates
remain surprisingly close to the benchmark estimates reported in table 4. In particular,
the discount factor remains close to one and the coeﬃcients on marginal costs still have
the correct sign. Also the sum of the coeﬃcients on marginal costs remains close to their
benchmark values.
The case with lagged inﬂation diﬀers notably. Typically, the role for lagged inﬂation
in the pricing equation is attributed to the presence of agents whose forecasts are not
perfectly rational, see Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999) or Roberts (1997). In the current setting this
interpretation is inappropriate because we have accounted for potential non-rationalities in
expectations through the use of survey data. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that lagged
inﬂation enters signiﬁcantly due to non-rationalities only: since the survey expectations are
likely to depend on lagged inﬂation rates, expected inﬂation and lagged inﬂation tend to be
collinear and the coeﬃcient on lagged inﬂation might capture variation in lagged inﬂation
that should be attributed to expected inﬂation.
To assess whether lagged inﬂation has explanatory power for inﬂation dynamics be-
yond its ability to predict expected inﬂation we perform the following exercise: we regress
lagged inﬂation on expected inﬂation and include the regression residuals into the standard
speciﬁcation (9) as an additional regressor.
Intuitively, the regression residuals represent that part of the variation of lagged inﬂation
that is orthogonal to expected inﬂation and, thus, does not explain variations in expecta-
tions. It should be clear that by including only these residuals into the pricing equation
when testing for the signiﬁcance of lagged inﬂation, we bias results in favor of rejecting a
role for lagged inﬂation.
Nevertheless, we ﬁnd that the orthogonalized part of lagged inﬂation is signiﬁcant at
the 1% level.18 This is independent from the marginal cost measure used, as shown in table
7. This ﬁnding strongly suggests that there is a role for lagged inﬂation in explaining the
18Pagan (1984) shows that under the null hypothesis of no role for lagged inﬂation the estimator of theinﬂation dynamics which goes well beyond its role in explaining how inﬂation expectations
deviate from rational expectations. This point is taken up in the next section.
6 Extension: The Indexation Model
The previous section has shown that lagged inﬂation seems to be an important variable
explaining inﬂation dynamics beyond what can be explained by inﬂation expectations and
marginal costs. Due to this ﬁnding we consider the model of Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2001), which attributes a role to lagged inﬂation because ﬁrms that do not
re-optimize their prices are assumed to index their prices using lagged inﬂation rates.
The analogue to equation (9) for this model is given by
Πt = γ1Πt−1 + γ2Ft [Πt+1]+γ3rmct + εt (11)





(1+β)θ ,a n dΠ t−1 is the lagged inﬂation rate.19 For
β = 1 the model is very similar to the relative contracting model of Fuhrer and Moore
(1995), the only diﬀerence being that it does not contain a moving average of real marginal
costs.
The results from estimating equation (11) by OLS are reported in table 8.20 The sec-
ond and ﬁfth column show the unrestricted estimates using unit labor costs and output,
respectively, as measures for marginal costs. All coeﬃcients have the predicted sign and are
signiﬁcant.
The structural parameters β and θ can be retrieved using β =
γ2
γ1 together with the
deﬁnition of γ3 and are reported in the lower panel of table 4. The standard deviations
indicate that both parameters are estimated rather imprecisely.
For a discount factor close to one, model (11) implies γ1 = γ2. Columns three and six
of table 8 report the results of estimating equation (11) when imposing this restriction.
standard error for the coeﬃcient of (orthogonalized) lagged inﬂation is consistent despite the fact that the
regressor is generated. The asymptotic t-Statistic is therefore valid.
19Πt−1 is not the orthogonalized lagged inﬂation rate as in the previous section.
20We also used IV estimation with two lags of expected inﬂation, and 4 lags of marginal costs as instru-
ments. The results are very similar to the ones reported in table 8.For both speciﬁcations F-tests do not reject the equality of γ1 and γ2. This contrasts to
the results reported by Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999) who estimated equation (11) under the
assumption of rational expectations.21 For all speciﬁcations reported in table 2 of their
paper, equality of the two coeﬃcients would be rejected. This suggests that the indexation
model performs better when survey expectations are used as a proxy for agents’ inﬂation
expectations.
The more stringent restriction γ1 = γ2 = 1
2 is also not rejected, as shown in column four
and seven of table 8.
Overall, the estimated coeﬃcients of equation (11) have the correct sign and are statis-
tically signiﬁcant independently from the measure of marginal costs used. Moreover, the
restrictions implied by theory cannot be rejected.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we studied the ability of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve to explain the
U.S. inﬂation experience once the assumption of rational inﬂation expectations is relaxed.
The data gave considerable support for the parameter restrictions implied by the stan-
dard forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips Curve. In particular, the discount factor was
found to be close to one, inﬂation was positively aﬀected by real marginal costs, and the
degree of price stickiness implied by the estimates suggested that about one ﬁfth of ﬁrms
reset price every quarter. These results were found to be independent from whether unit
labor cost or detrended output were used as a measure for real marginal costs.
Despite the generally supportive evidence, we showed that lagged inﬂation seems to be
a signiﬁcant determinant of inﬂation dynamics, even when taking care of potential non-
rationalities in inﬂation expectations through the use of survey expectations. The standard
New Keynesian Phillips Curve cannot account for this ﬁnding.
When estimating the indexation model suggested by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2001), which introduces an explicit role for lagged inﬂation, we ﬁnd that our data supports
the implied parameter restrictions.
21These authors gave a diﬀerent economic interpretation to equation (11): lagged inﬂation was supposed
to enter because of the presence of backward looking agents.Although uncertainty remains about the role of lagged inﬂation, the results presented
in this paper seem to suggest that the New Keynesian Phillips Curve oﬀers an empirically
plausible explanation of inﬂation dynamics as a function of output dynamics or unit labor
costs once inﬂation expectations are approximated with survey data.8 Appendix
8.1 Subjective expectations and the NKPC
Here we show how one can derive the NKPC (6) with subjective expectations. Subtracting
equation (1) from the same equation shifted one period forward delivers
Πt+1 =( 1− θ)Π∗




















Applying the operator Ft (as deﬁned in equation (7)) to equation (12) gives
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t+1 +θpt to obtain the third, and mct = rmct +pt to obtain the last
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(14)
Substituting (14) into (13) delivers (6).8.2 The data sources
Below we describe the data sources and the data deﬁnitions used in the paper:
Expected inﬂation is constructed using the inﬂation rate implied by the quarterly mean
forecast of the implicit GDP price deﬂator (GNP price deﬂator prior to 1992) from the
Survey of Professional Forecasters and the actual value of the current implicit GDP deﬂator
(GNP deﬂator prior to 1992), 1968:4-2003:1. The data can be downloaded from the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia at http://www.phil.frb.org/.
Actual inﬂation is constructed using the quarterly nominal and real GDP from the April
2003 release of the NIPA Tables 1.7 and 1.8, 1968:4-2003:1, which can be downloaded at
http://www.bea.gov /bea /dn/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp?Selected=N.
Unit labor costs used in the main text are constructed using the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics Unit Labor Costs series PRS85006113, 1968:4-2003:1, deﬂated by the Bureau Labor
Statistics Implicit Price Deﬂator series PRS85006143. Both series refers to the non-farm
business sector and can be downloaded at http://data.bls.gov/, under the heading Major
Sector Productivity and Costs Index. To construct the measure of unit labor costs used
in the regression we take the log deviations from the mean. We also experimented with
the ratio of compensation of employees to national income minus proprietor’s income. The
compensation of employees, the national income, and the proprietor’s income series, 1968:4-
2003:1, are taken from the April 2003 release of the NIPA Table 1.15. The table is accessible
at http://www.bea.gov/bea /dn/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp?Selected=N.
Output gap in the main text is constructed using real GDP from the April 2003 release
of NIPA Table 1.8, 1968:4-2003:1, which can be downloaded at http://www.bea.gov/bea
/dn/nipaweb /SelectTable.asp?Selected=N. To construct the measure of output gap used
in the regression we take the log and linearly detrend. We also experimented using the
quarterly series of the real GDP in non-farm business sector and in non-farm business
sector less housing as proxy for real activity, which are available from the same NIPA table.
Consumer Price Index This is the CPI for All Urban Consumer, as issued by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, series CUSR0000SA0. This monthly series is available at the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub /time.series/cu/). Quarterly data are obtained by
averaging the monthly inﬂation rates of the considered quarter.References
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Solid line: unit labor costs; dashed line: detrended output gap.
Figure 1: Unit labor costs and output 
 





Solid line: expected inﬂation; dashed line: actual inﬂation.
Figure 2: Expected and actual inﬂation 
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Figure 3: Correlation between actual inﬂation(t) and output gap(t+k) 
Lag










Figure 4: Correlation between actual inﬂation(t) and unit labor costs(t+k)Table 1: Biasedness of expectations
Constant 0.004
(0.001)**
Dummy (1968 : 4 − 1979 : 4) -0.014
(0.003)**




Note: The dependent variable is the inﬂation forecast error. In column two forecast
errors are regressed on a constant; in column three forecast errors are regressed on a
constant and two time dummies. Asymptotic Newey-West 12 lags standard errors are





Dummy (1968 : 4 − 1979 : 4) -0.014
(0.003)**
Dummy (1980 : 1 − 1989 : 4) 0.001
(0.002)
Observations 138 138
Note: The dependent variable is the inﬂation forecast error. The second column ﬁts
an AR(1) and reports the AR-coeﬃcient; the third column adds two time dummies;
the forth column adds a fourth-order moving average to capture potential seasonalities.
Asymptotic standard errors are reported in parentheses. One (two) star(s) indicate
signiﬁcance at the 5% (1%) level.Table 3: Orthogonality tests
F-statistics
Unit Labor Costs Output Gap Inﬂation CPI Inﬂation All
Lags 1-4 6.98 5.26 5.73 5.25 3.33
(0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0001)
Observations 134 134 134 134 134
R-squared 0.1523 0.1135 0.1246 0.1134 0.2190
Lags 2-4 3.99 6.50 4.68 5.01 3.54
(0.0093) (0.0004) (0.0039) (0.0025) (0.0002)
Observations 134 134 134 134 134
R-squared 0.0632 0.1305 0.0975 0.1037 0.1863
Note: The inﬂation forecast error is re g r e s s e do nl a g s1t o4( t o pp a n e l )a n d2t o4
(bottom panel) of output, inﬂation, unit labor costs, CPI inﬂation, and on all of these
variables in the row named ’All’. The table reports F-statistics for the hypothesis
that the coeﬃcients on all included regressors are jointly equal to zero wit p-values in
parentheses.Table 4: The New Keynesian Phillips Curve
Unit Labor Costs Output Gap
Expected Inﬂation Lagged Inﬂation Expected Inﬂation Lagged Inﬂation
β 1.002 0.961 1.031 0.967
(0.039)** (0.016)** (0.048)** (0.011)**
λ 0.059 0.010 0.026 0.026
(0.019)** (0.011) (0.013)* (0.008)**
θ 0.783 0.839
(0.039)** (0.042)**
Observations 138 137 138 137
Note: The dependent variable is actual inﬂation. In the second column it is regressed
on expected inﬂation and unit labor costs, in the third column on lagged inﬂation and
unit labor costs, in the fourth column on expected inﬂation and output gap, and in
the ﬁfth column on lagged inﬂation and output gap. The coeﬃcients β and λ denote
the discount factor and the coeﬃcient attached to marginal costs. The value of the
stickiness parameter θ is calculated using the point estimates of β and λ. Asymptotic
Newey-West 12 lags standard errors are reported in parentheses. One (two) star(s)
indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% (1%) level.Table 5: Sub-Sample Stability
Unit Labor Costs Output Gap
βλ θ β λθ
1968:4-1979:4 1.157 0.125 0.657 1.156 0.019 0.800
(0.040)** (0.024)** (0.0251)** (0.0596)** (0.025) (0.089)**
1980:1-1989:4 0.917 0.052 0.824 0.924 0.037 0.851
(0.035)** (0.022)* (0.040)** (0.040)** (0.010)** (0.032)**
1990:1-2003:1 0.854 0.032 0.884 0.863 0.036 0.874
(0.031)** (0.011)** (0.032)** (0.027)** (0.009)** (0.025)**
Note: The coeﬃcients β, λ and θ denote the discount factor, the coeﬃcient attached
to real marginal costs, and the degree of price stickiness, respectively. Columns two to
four use unit labor costs while columns ﬁve to seven use detrended output. Asymptotic
Newey-West 12 lags standard errors are reported in parentheses. One (two) star(s)
indicate signiﬁcancy at the 5%(1%) level.Table 6: The Role of Lagged Variables
Unit Labor Costs Output
β 0.629 1.042 0.999 0.528 1.009 1.023
(0.088)** (0.243)** (0.039)** (0.070)** (0.294)** (0.045)**
λ 0.038 0.059 0.055 0.025 0.025 -0.035







Observations 137 137 137 137 137 137
Note: The dependent variable is actual inﬂation, which is regressed on expected inﬂation
(β)a n dm a r g i n a lc o s t s( λ). In columns two to four (ﬁve to seven) marginal costs are
given by unit labor costs (detrended output). As additional regressors enter lagged
inﬂation (columns two and ﬁve), lagged expected inﬂation (columns three and six)
and lagged marginal costs (columns four and seven). Asymptotic Newey-West 12 lags
standard errors are reported in parentheses. One (two) star(s) indicate signiﬁcance at
the 5% (1%) level.Table 7: Lagged Inﬂation










Note: The dependent variable is actual inﬂation, which is regressed on expected inﬂation
(β) and real marginal costs (λ), given by unit labor costs in the second column and
detrended output in the third column. As additional regressor enters orthogonalized
lagged inﬂation which are the residuals obtained from regressing t − 1 inﬂation on the
time t forecast of t+1 inﬂation. The value of the stickiness parameter θ is calculated
using the point estimates of β and λ. Asymptotic Newey-West 12 lags standard errors
are reported in parentheses. One (two) star(s) indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% (1%)
level.Table 8: The Indexation Model
Unit Labor Costs Output
unrestricted γ1 = γ2 γ1 = γ2 =0 .5 unrestricted γ1 = γ2 γ1 = γ2 =0 .5
γ1 0.365 0.470 0.463 0.521
(0.078)** (0.018)** (0.072)** (0.020)**
γ2 0.595 0.595
(0.085)** (0.076)**
γ3 0.044 0.041 0.030 0.025 0.025 0.025
(0.019)* (0.018)* (0.010)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.010)*
Constant 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 137 137 137 137 137 137
F-tests γ1 = γ2 γ1 =0 .5 γ1 = γ2 γ1 =0 .5
2.10 2.85 0.87 1.12
(0.15) (0.093) (0.352) (0.293)
β 1.628 1.285
(0.564)** (0.347)**
θ 0.531 0.752 0.782 0.686 0.799 0.799
(0.160)** (0.0162)** (0.009)** (0.141)** (0.007)** (0.009)**
Note: The dependent variable is actual inﬂation, which is regressed on lagged inﬂation
(γ1), expected inﬂation (γ2), and real marginal costs (γ3), where the latter are given
by unit labor costs (detrended output) in columns two to four (ﬁve to seven). Columns
two and ﬁve report unrestricted estimates; columns three and six constrain γ1 and γ2
to be equal; columns foura n ds e v e nr e s t r i c tγ1 and γ2 to be equal to 0.5. Successive
F-tests for these restrictions with p-values in parentheses are reported in the respective
columns. The values of β and θ reported are the ones implied by the point estimates
of γ1, γ2,a n dγ3. Asymptotic Newey-West 12 lags standard errors are reported in
parentheses. One (two) star(s) indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% (1%) level.